RH POWER NETWORK / CROSS-BORDER INFLUENCE

Power beyond the state

Map the armed partners, front groups, criminal intermediaries and contractors connected to Iran, Russia, China and North Korea

Explore proxy networks ↓
PROXY NETWORKS
Organizations & networks
19
Sourced connections
20
State lenses
4

Selected public records reviewed 13 October 2026. Each relationship retains its own evidence date.

01 / FOLLOW THE RELATIONSHIP

Choose a state. Inspect the connections.

Click a tile to highlight its links. Use Open dossier to read its evidence.

Support relationshipState structure / controlAttributed tasking / frontLegacy / reorganization

Line style identifies the relationship category, not a confidence score. All claims remain attributed.

Swipe across the chart, or use the group list below.

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Positions organize the page. Distance from the center does not measure loyalty, control or operational proximity.

Jump to selected group's evidence ↓
Browse every group as a list

Iran

Russia

China

North Korea

02 / METHOD & LIMITS

One map. Different relationships.

This is a selected relationship atlas, not a complete list of proxies, a live order of battle or a legal sanctions screening tool. The umbrella label covers different mechanisms, which remain explicitly categorized.

State support does not mean total control

A funding or weapons link does not establish that a sponsor ordered every attack. Dossiers identify the agency, authority, date and limitation behind each connection.

Fronts, contractors and state forces stay distinct

HAYI is shown as an alleged front. Cyber clusters can mix officials and contractors. China's maritime militia and RGB-controlled Lazarus are comparison cases, not independent foreign militias.

Claims remain claims

A group's responsibility claim is not independent corroboration. A government assessment is attributed. An indictment is an allegation; defendants are presumed innocent unless proven guilty.

Dates matter

Wagner's reorganization and the disbanded Hainan Xiandun company are labeled. Review date means RH checked the cited sources, not that every organization is confirmed operational today. Similar names do not establish organizational identity.

Read size estimates in context

Each overview gives a dated estimate or states what is unknown. Fighters, members, deployed vessels and customer reach are different measures, not comparable force totals. “Why this alignment” summarizes documented links and incentives; it does not establish every member's motive.

Source ledger · 38 public records
  1. Al-Saadi criminal complaint: European incident allegations ↗

    U.S. District Court / DOJ filing · 2026 · Incident allegations, pages 15–19; not court findings

  2. UK sanctions HAYI / IMCR ↗

    UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office · 2026-07-13

  3. Al-Saadi indictment and alleged HAYI front ↗

    U.S. Department of Justice · 2026-07-22 · Page updated

  4. Joint statement on Iran and HAYI-claimed attacks ↗

    UK FCDO and partner governments · 2026-10-12

  5. Assessment of Iran's regional and global activities ↗

    Office of the Director of National Intelligence · 2024-07

  6. 2026 Annual Threat Assessment ↗

    Office of the Director of National Intelligence · 2026-03 · Information cutoff: 14 March 2026

  7. Financial facilitation network supporting Hizballah ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2025-05-15

  8. Houthi illicit revenue and procurement networks ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2025-09-11

  9. Country Reports on Terrorism 2023 ↗

    U.S. Department of State (archived) · 2023 · Reporting period, not current status

  10. U.S. and UK target Zindashti's transnational network ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2024-01-29

  11. Sanctions on the Foxtrot Network and its leader ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2025-03-12

  12. UK sanctions Iranian-backed Foxtrot network ↗

    UK FCDO · 2025-04-14

  13. EU restrictive measures against the Wagner Group ↗

    Council of the European Union · 2021-12-13

  14. UK sanctions Africa Corps and Kremlin-linked mercenary groups ↗

    UK FCDO · 2024-11-07

  15. UK statement on mercenaries and state-contracted Africa Corps ↗

    UK Mission to the UN, Geneva · 2025-09-15

  16. UK statement on mercenaries and Russian influence networks ↗

    UK Mission to the UN, Geneva · 2026-09-15

  17. Treasury sanctions PMC Redut and other Russian entities ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2023-02-24

  18. Doppelganger domains seized in Russian influence case ↗

    U.S. Department of Justice · 2024-09-04

  19. Charges against Chinese contract hackers and officials ↗

    U.S. Department of Justice · 2025-03-05

  20. APT31 and the Wuhan XRZ front company ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2024-03-25

  21. APT40 and the Hainan Xiandun front-company indictment ↗

    U.S. Department of Justice · 2021-07-19

  22. Joint government attribution of APT40 to China's MSS ↗

    CISA and international partner agencies · 2024-07-08

  23. 2025 report on China's military and security developments ↗

    U.S. Department of Defense · 2025-12-23

  24. China's Third Sea Force: ties to the PLA ↗

    U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute · 2017

  25. Sanctions on RGB-controlled North Korean cyber groups ↗

    U.S. Treasury · 2019-09-13

  26. FBI attribution of stolen cryptocurrency to DPRK actors ↗

    Federal Bureau of Investigation · 2023-08-22

  27. Kata'ib Hizballah: Country Reports on Terrorism 2024 ↗

    U.S. State Department, reproduced by ecoi.net · 2026-05-01 · Covers 2024; the strength figure is not a 2026 count

  28. Hizballah: Country Reports on Terrorism 2024 ↗

    U.S. State Department, reproduced by ecoi.net · 2026-05-01 · Covers 2024; the strength figure is not a 2026 count

  29. Hamas: Country Reports on Terrorism 2024 ↗

    U.S. State Department, reproduced by ecoi.net · 2026-05-01 · Covers 2024; the strength figure is not a 2026 count

  30. Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Country Reports on Terrorism 2024 ↗

    U.S. State Department, reproduced by ecoi.net · 2026-05-01 · Covers 2024; the strength figure is not a 2026 count

  31. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq: goals, resources and size estimates ↗

    Mapping Militants Project · 2026-10-13 · Access date, not publication date; cites a 10,000–15,000 estimate for April 2024

  32. Yemen Panel of Experts report S/2024/731, paragraph 31 ↗

    UN Security Council Panel of Experts · 2024-10-11 · The panel could not independently verify the newly recruited fighter count

  33. Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea: background and Iranian support ↗

    Congressional Research Service · 2024-01-31

  34. White House briefing on Wagner's Ukraine deployment ↗

    White House transcript, American Presidency Project · 2023-01-20 · Historical Ukraine deployment, not current global strength

  35. Africa Corps in Mali: reported force size and operations ↗

    Associated Press · 2025-12-07 · Analyst estimate for Mali only

  36. Rybar: organization, Rostec funding and influence activity ↗

    U.S. State Department, Rewards for Justice · 2026-10-13 · Access date; the page does not state a publication date

  37. All Together Now: China's Militia in 2025 ↗

    CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative · 2026-02-23 · 2025 average at 12 monitored reefs; not a fleet-wide census

  38. Pulling Back the Curtain on China's Maritime Militia ↗

    CSIS AMTI and C4ADS · 2021-11-18