RH POWER NETWORK · NORTH KOREA ARSENAL

North Korea’s evolving arsenal.

Legacy aircraft. Emerging drones. A rapidly changing missile force. Explore the equipment behind Pyongyang’s military ambitions, with a clear line between what is listed, demonstrated and claimed.

Explore the systems

Selected systems: 25
Categories: 4
Evidence focus: 2025 / 26
Reviewed: 9 Sep 2026

An uneven modernization

North Korea’s listed aircraft are mostly older designs. Its missile and drone programs include much newer systems, but public displays and state claims leave important gaps. Quantities and ranges stay compact, with the qualification one click away.

Listed fleets
Tested systems
Emerging programs
Unverified stockpiles

Search systems

Show category

Showing 25 selected systems across four categories.

Dated quantities; labeled range types in km. How we count · Reading ranges

Jets

Helicopters

Drones

Missiles

Polish MiG-29A

Polish MiG-29A. Photo record: Taken on 3 June 2016, 18:41:02. This is an identification reference from another operator or museum, not a North Korean airframe or evidence of present readiness.

Jets

MiG-29

Twin-engine fighter

Operator: Korean People's Army Air Force
Origin: Soviet Union
Public status: Listed in active fleet
Flight range (type ref.): 1,430 km

Source and caveat

MiG-29 9-12 museum reference

Historical variant reference, not a North Korean configuration measurement or combat radius. The museum separately gives 2,100 km with external fuel.

Source: Undated museum record. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

Ukraine State Aviation Museum: MiG-29 9-12 ↗
Publicly reported quantity: Listed fleet 26 aircraft 1 Oct 2025 directory baseline

Source and caveat

Three training aircraft are separately listed and excluded from the combat count. Listed does not mean mission-capable today.

Current operational inventory is not publicly verified.

FlightGlobal / Cirium World Air Forces 2026 ↗

Recent evidence / current relevance

2026 directory / Oct 2025 baseline

Retained in the 2026 directory. This is a dated service listing, not a new delivery or present-day readiness check.

Why it matters

One of the newer designs in a predominantly Cold War-era combat-aircraft fleet.

What the record establishes

The directory lists 26 combat aircraft.

Evidence limit: Three training aircraft are separately listed and excluded from the combat count.

Image: Julian Herzog (Website), CC BY 4.0 Image license terms ↗

EQUIPMENT → INSTITUTIONS

Explore the people and organizations behind the force.

North Korean leadership and institutions ↗All country networks ↗China arsenal ↗

Method and limits

How we count

Reviewed 9 September 2026. “Listed fleet” preserves the FlightGlobal/Cirium 2026 directory baseline, initially compiled on 1 October 2025. It is not a count of mission-capable aircraft today. Combat aircraft and trainers remain separate.

“Not publicly verified” means unknown, not zero. Missile launches, parade vehicles, serial-number observations and production targets do not become current inventory. A family entry does not establish every subvariant.

Reading ranges

Numerical ranges use kilometers. Aircraft flight distance, ferry range, drone reach and missile engagement range describe different things. Historical aircraft references from other operators are labeled and do not measure North Korean configurations.

Missile estimates depend on payload and trajectory. The short horizontal distance of a lofted test is not the missile’s maximum range. State-reported cruise-missile travel is labeled as a claim. Conflicting assessments remain visible in the notes.

Selection and source limits

This selected guide covers six jet types, four helicopters, three drone programs and twelve missile systems or families. The KN-25 large guided rocket is included with missiles. This is not a complete order of battle.

State media establishes what authorities display or claim. Foreign government assessments and independent analysis are separately attributed. Review date and observation date are different. Older evidence is retained when a newer type-specific record is not established.

Images and attribution

Photos from other operators, museum examples and published identification diagrams are visibly labeled. They illustrate the design, not today’s North Korean inventory. Historical photographs are not evidence of new deliveries.

Four entries currently have an explicit image-rights notice: Saetbyol-4, Saetbyol-9, Kumsong tactical drones and Hwasong-20. Their source links lead to reporting with photographs. A suitable reusable photograph has not been established, so state-media images are not presented as public-domain assets.

Japan MOD identification diagrams are excerpts displayed from its credited reference chart. Cropping is by RH; it does not imply Japanese government endorsement. Other image authors and licenses are linked in each detail panel.

No bases, deployment locations, coverage rings, launch sites, vulnerabilities or real-time force posture are mapped here.

Source record

01
FlightGlobal / Cirium World Air Forces 2026 ↗
North Korea table, PDF page 26, visually checked. Initial data compiled 1 October 2025. Combat and training entries remain separate; listed fleet is not mission-capable inventory today.
02
Ukraine State Aviation Museum: MiG-29 9-12 ↗
Undated museum specification. Flight distance 1,430 km; 2,100 km with external fuel. Used only as a historical variant reference.
03
Ukraine State Aviation Museum: Su-25 ↗
Undated early-model reference distinguishes 750 km flight distance from 1,850 km ferry distance. Not North Korean mission performance.
04
Ukraine MOD White Book 2005, printed page 128 ↗
Published 2006; table visually checked. Mi-8 and Mi-24 flight distances are historical type references with unspecified configuration, not North Korean combat radii.
05
CSIS Missile Threat: North Korea catalog, 15 Jan 2026 ↗
Reference catalog. Where its status or range differs from a detailed profile, the entry preserves the narrower evidence rather than treating the catalog as an audited inventory.
06
CSIS Beyond Parallel: UAV assessment, 3 Mar 2026 ↗
Original analysis of 25 February imagery identifies both Saebyeol types and assesses prototype or pre-production activity. No source imagery, coordinates or facility maps are reproduced.
07
38 North: drone program assessment, 25 Sep 2025 ↗
Original analysis distinguishes the Saetbyol reconnaissance/combat aircraft and Kumsong tactical-drone family. Observed airframes and serials are not present-day fleet totals; performance remains uncertain.
08
Japan MOD: missile development, Aug 2026 ↗
Dated government assessment. Estimated ICBM reach depends on payload. A launch chronology counts events, not stockpiles. Geographical graphics and deployment information are not reproduced.
09
38 North: solid-ICBM outlook, 2 Apr 2026 ↗
The April assessment describes Hwasong-20 as untested and Hwasong-19 as flown once. A motor ground test is not a whole-missile flight demonstration.
10
38 North: new missile displays, 4 Nov 2025 ↗
Analysis of September/October 2025 displays, including Hwasong-20. Claims of improved payload capability remain distinct from demonstrated performance.
11
38 North: Hwasong-16 test assessment, 9 Jan 2025 ↗
Original technical assessment distinguishes the booster from the glide vehicle. A successful booster flight does not independently validate all payload claims.
12
38 North: Hwasal-2 and theater missiles, 1 May 2024 ↗
Hwasal-2 deployment analysis and reported 2,000 km flight distance. State-reported travel distance is not independently measured straight-line reach.
13
38 North: submarine missile limits, 11 Sep 2023 ↗
Explains Pukguksong-3's 2019 submersible-platform test. A missile test or visible submarine tubes do not establish an operational patrol capability.
14
CSIS Missile Threat: KN-23, 23 Apr 2024 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
15
38 North: KN-23 assessment, 14 Aug 2026 ↗
Original analysis identifies 800 km as the KN-23's maximum demonstrated range. Used here for that distance reference only, not as evidence of a current stock count or identical performance across variants.
16
CSIS Missile Threat: KN-24, 23 Apr 2024 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
17
CSIS Missile Threat: KN-25, 23 Apr 2024 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
18
CSIS Missile Threat: HWASONG-12, 23 Apr 2024 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
19
CSIS Missile Threat: HWASONG-16B, 13 Jan 2026 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
20
CSIS Missile Threat: HWASONG-17, 11 May 2026 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
21
CSIS Missile Threat: HWASONG-18, 13 Jan 2026 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
22
CSIS Missile Threat: HWASONG-19, 13 Jan 2026 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
23
CSIS Missile Threat: PUKGUKSONG-3, 23 Apr 2024 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.
24
CSIS Missile Threat: KN-06, 23 Apr 2024 ↗
Dated technical reference and development history. Range estimates are configuration-dependent and do not establish current stock numbers.