RH POWER NETWORK · UKRAINE ARSENAL

Ukraine’s evolving arsenal.

Western aircraft. Ukrainian ingenuity. Layered air defense. Explore the jets, helicopters, drones and missiles shaping Ukraine’s defense, with a public record behind every entry.

Explore the systems
Selected systems
24
Categories
4
Evidence focus
2025 / 26
Reviewed through
8 Sep 2026

01

New capability. Clear context.

Recent arrivals and domestic developments sit alongside older aircraft documented in Ukrainian service. Each date identifies an event or source review; it does not mean every system was introduced in 2026.

  • Delivered equipment
  • Legacy service types
  • Procurement announcements
  • Attributed performance claims
Show category

Showing 24 selected systems across four categories.

Dated quantities; labeled range types in km. How we count · Reading ranges

01

Jets

6
02

Helicopters

4
03

Drones

6
04

Missiles

8

EXPLORE THE WIDER PICTURE

Different forces. The same evidence standard.

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02

Method and limits

This is a selected equipment guide, not a Ukrainian leadership network or a complete inventory. Tanks, artillery, naval systems, most small FPV types, and the full range of air-launched weapons are outside this edition.

Recent means recent public relevance, not necessarily a new design. The guide distinguishes dated delivery or use records, procurement announcements, manufacturer catalogs and older service baselines. An undated official listing may lag events. None establishes the number ready for combat today.

Reading quantities: the quantity review was completed on 8 September 2026. Each number retains its own source date and counting basis. FlightGlobal's 2026 directory uses initial data drawn on 1 October 2025; those figures are historical fleet estimates. Trainer counts are shown separately. F-16 figures sum two donor contributions, and the Octopus figure is an order. Neither is a current holding. Figures across these different measures must not be added into an arsenal total.

“Not publicly verified” means the reviewed evidence does not support a defensible current count. It does not mean zero equipment. For air defense, complete fire units, launchers and interceptor missiles require separate ledgers. Unknown current inventory is shown explicitly, and losses are not subtracted from incomplete delivery or directory records.

Reading ranges: added 9 September 2026, with each source's original date retained. Distances are in kilometers. Flight range describes travel distance in a reference configuration; ferry range prioritizes distance and is not combat radius. Combat radius requires an outbound flight, mission time and a return. We do not calculate it by halving flight range. Drone control range is communication reach, not total travel; one-way reach applies to expendable systems. Air-defense engagement distance is separate from altitude and does not define guaranteed protection.

Range figures are public specifications, historical type references or attributed official claims, not verified limits of Ukraine's equipment today. “Type ref.” marks a historical reference; named variants such as F-16C/D or SHARK-M are not silently applied to other versions. “Advertised” identifies manufacturer data; “claimed” identifies first-party wartime statements. A “greater than” figure is a lower bound, never a maximum. Expand a range's source note for configuration, date and caveat. Where the reviewed evidence does not support a number, that limit is shown instead.

Western transfers and Ukrainian-built systems are identified separately. Future aircraft agreements are not counted as delivered aircraft: for example, the MoD’s 5 September 2026 coalition review distinguishes Gripen commitments from acquired F-16s and Mirages.

Ukrainian government and military statements are first-party sources in a war. Claimed reach, production, adoption and results remain attributed. Manufacturer specifications are not independent combat testing. Sections marked “RH assessment” explain why an entry matters rather than claim a newly verified event.

Every tile has credited imagery. Labels identify historical photos, earlier variants, exhibits, launches, launcher references and recovered wreckage. Flamingo uses a clearly labeled licensed technical illustration. Images are resized for display; source alterations are disclosed. A photograph does not prove a present-day loadout or deployment.

Air-defense systems are grouped under missiles. Peklo is counted once there as a missile-drone. The page does not map bases, launch positions, vulnerabilities or real-time force movements. Dated public quantities do not establish present-day stockpiles or serviceable fleet totals.

Source record

  1. 01
    Dassault Aviation: aircraft program overview ↗

    Undated manufacturer overview, reviewed 9 Sep 2026. Gives Mirage 2000-5 dimensions and weights, but no configuration-specific flight range; no numeric range adopted from this record.

  2. 02
    UK MoD: Storm Shadow assistance, 25 May 2023 ↗

    Public range above 250 km is a lower bound, not a maximum. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  3. 03
    US Air Force: F-16 fact sheet, Sep 2021 reference ↗

    C/D reference lists ferry range above 1,740 nautical miles, about 3,220 km. Not a specification for Ukraine's donated A/B airframes or their combat radius. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  4. 04
    Ukraine MoD: White Book 2005, pp. 128-130 ↗

    Official historical type-reference tables, published 2006; public mirror. Flight distance, not combat radius. Fuel, altitude and load conditions are unspecified. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  5. 05
    Ukraine State Aviation Museum: Su-25 reference ↗

    Undated early-model Su-25 exhibit record explicitly distinguishes flight range from ferry range. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  6. 06
    US Naval Postgraduate School: UH-60A/L table, 2012, p. 21 ↗

    Table 4 reproduces US Army reference specifications: UH-60A range 320 nautical miles, about 590 km. Not a Ukrainian mission profile. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  7. 07
    Baykar: TB2 product brochure, 2022 reference ↗

    Manufacturer brochure distributed by the trade-show organizer. Lists below 300 km for line-of-sight communications separately from BLOS; no assumption that Ukraine has every configuration. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  8. 08
    Ukrspecsystems: SHARK-M technical specifications ↗

    Undated manufacturer page, reviewed 9 Sep 2026. Advertises up to 180 km real-time video/telemetry connection. Applies to M, not every SHARK-family airframe.

  9. 09
    Ukraine MoD: Vampire overview, 24 Apr 2025 ↗

    Official description claims payload carriage over 20 km. Does not define whether that distance includes a return leg. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  10. 10
    Lockheed Martin: ATACMS product specifications ↗

    Undated current catalog, reviewed 9 Sep 2026. Describes a unitary-warhead missile with a 300 km maximum; not all historical ATACMS variants or all Ukrainian rounds.

  11. 11
    Diehl Defence: IRIS-T SLM specification, 22 Jun 2023 ↗

    Manufacturer gives up to 40 km engagement distance and up to 20 km altitude. Horizontal range and altitude are separate; neither defines guaranteed coverage. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  12. 12
    RTX: Patriot variants and development, 29 May 2025 ↗

    Manufacturer distinguishes PAC-2/PAC-3 development. No single Ukrainian interceptor or target-specific engagement distance established. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  13. 13
    Kongsberg: NASAMS configurations ↗

    Undated manufacturer overview distinguishes AMRAAM, AMRAAM ER and AIM-9X configurations. No single engagement distance adopted for Ukraine. Reviewed 9 Sep 2026.

  14. 14
    FlightGlobal / Cirium: World Air Forces 2026, pp. 11 and 32 ↗

    Archived original directory. Page 11 dates the initial data to 1 October 2025; page 32 lists Ukraine. Combat and training categories remain separate. Directory active-fleet estimates do not establish present-day mission readiness.

  15. 15
    Netherlands: Defence annual report 2025, published 2026 ↗

    Reports delivery of the last of 24 Dutch F-16s. Cumulative donor contribution, not surviving Ukrainian inventory.

  16. 16
    Danish Armed Forces: F-16 contribution, 5 Aug 2026 ↗

    Reports 19 Danish F-16s donated to Ukraine. Combined with the Dutch record, supports RH's 43-aircraft transfer subtotal, not current availability.

  17. 17
    Ukraine MoD: aviation coalition, 5 Sep 2026 ↗

    Distinguishes acquired F-16s and Mirages from future Gripen agreements. A commitment is not a delivery.

  18. 18
    Ukraine MoD: Air Force equipment overview ↗

    Undated official overview, reviewed 8 Sep 2026. Establishes listed aircraft families, not aircraft availability or current fleet totals.

  19. 19
    Ukraine presidency: F-16 and Mirage deliveries, 3 Aug 2025 ↗

    Official confirmation of received aircraft. Does not specify a complete variant or delivery ledger.

  20. 20
    GUR: helicopter-service background, 16 Apr 2023 ↗

    Historical first-party account naming Mi-8, Mi-24 and Black Hawk experience. Performance comparisons are not adopted.

  21. 21
    ArmyInform: Army Aviation reporting, reviewed 8 Sep 2026 ↗

    MoD news archive includes Mi-8 reporting dated 3 Jul 2026. Older Mi-24 records are kept distinct from current Mi-8 reporting.

  22. 22
    GUR: Black Hawk training, 26 Nov 2025 ↗

    Dated first-party training record; no inference about fleet size or weapons integration.

  23. 23
    UK Parliament: Sea King donations, 19 Dec 2023 ↗

    Government confirmation of three donated search-and-rescue helicopters. A historical transfer total is not a present-day serviceability count.

  24. 24
    House of Lords Library: military assistance, 2025 ↗

    2025 assistance summary includes Sea King helicopters and Storm Shadow missiles.

  25. 25
    Ukrspecsystems: PD-2 current product record ↗

    Manufacturer specifications reviewed 8 Sep 2026; endurance varies by configuration. Advertised performance is not an independently verified operational result.

  26. 26
    Ukrspecsystems: long-range reconnaissance, 19 May 2025 ↗

    Manufacturer's contemporary discussion of PD-2 surveillance applications, not a Ukrainian procurement announcement.

  27. 27
    Ukrspecsystems: SHARK-M announcement, 30 Jan 2025 ↗

    Distinguishes the M upgrade from earlier SHARK airframes. Announcement and manufacturer claims do not establish fleet-wide adoption.

  28. 28
    Ukraine MoD: Vampire manufacturer, 2 Jan 2026 ↗

    Current official record of the drone's manufacturer and industrial support.

  29. 29
    Ukraine MoD: drone procurement channel, 24 Jun 2026 ↗

    Identified Vampire image and procurement context. The article's aggregate drone total is not a Vampire total.

  30. 30
    Ukraine presidency: domestic weapons review, 14 Apr 2026 ↗

    Official identification of Liutyi, Neptune, Peklo and Flamingo. Adoption, production and range claims remain attributed.

  31. 31
    Ukraine MoD: Octopus procurement, 30 Apr 2026 ↗

    Procurement announcement, not proof that every contracted interceptor had been delivered.

  32. 32
    UK government: Octopus program, 20 Nov 2025 ↗

    First-party description of the Ukrainian-designed interceptor and UK industrial cooperation.

  33. 33
    Ukraine Cabinet: Peklo first batch, 6 Dec 2024 ↗

    Delivery and serial-production announcement. Published range is an official claim.

  34. 34
    Fire Point: FP-5 product family ↗

    Manufacturer identification of Flamingo. Reviewed 8 Sep 2026; no adoption of unverified production or success-rate claims.

  35. 35
    UK government: Storm Shadow support baseline, 2024 ↗

    Official aid record includes additional Storm Shadow missiles for Ukraine.

  36. 36
    UK government: missile production cooperation, 9 Jul 2025 ↗

    British-French orders and production-line investment. These are not all deliveries to Ukraine.

  37. 37
    ArmyInform / General Staff: ATACMS use, 24 Feb 2026 ↗

    Dated, attributed use report. The page does not adopt target-damage claims or infer remaining stocks.

  38. 38
    Ukraine MoD: Patriot and IRIS-T munitions, 10 Jun 2026 ↗

    Identifies continued missile-supply efforts. Requests and agreements are not completed deliveries.

  39. 39
    Ukraine MoD: German-supplied systems, 13 May 2026 ↗

    Official retrospective on German support, including IRIS-T. Does not establish operational battery locations.

  40. 40
    Ukraine Cabinet / MoD: NASAMS sustainment discussions, 17 Apr 2026 ↗

    Identifies discussions about missiles for NASAMS, Patriot and F-16. Future supply is not counted as delivered.

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